Introduction
The issue of gender equity in the workplace has received considerable attention from Canadian public in recent years. Unions and women's groups have lobbied strenuously laws that provide female workers with the same employment conditions and opportunities as male workers. Legislators have responded by enacting statutes for pay equity, employment equity, and human rights. Yet, women's earnings remain at little more th• 65 percent of men's earnings for full-time, year-round work (Weiner and Gunderson, 1990 13 I).
Sweden provides a stark contrast to Canada in matters of gender pay equality. In that country, the female-male pay ratio increased dramatically during the 1960s and 1970s, reaching 90 percent in manufacturing (Ginsburg, 1983 : 164) and surpassing 80 percent ia the economy as a whole (Acker, 1991: 248) . Scholars have noted this success and urged other nations like Canada to follow Sweden's example in narrowing the gender pay gap (see, for example, Rubery, 1992) . However, the first part of this paper will argue that Sweden's successes are grounded in a social democratic ideology that inhibits their easy transference to a liberal Canadian milieu. Special attention is focused on the different roles ideology defines for employer, union, and state to demonstrate the practical incompatibilities of Swedish social democracy and Canadian liberalism that would impede any efforts to copy Sweden's policies in Canada .
. An overemphasis on pay provides a second reason for Canada to reject Sweden as a potential model, since gender equity requires mo ·e than a fairer share of rewards for women. A more even distribution of organisational power is also necessary, so that women are not as confined by the horizontal and vertical divisions of labour. However, Sweden' progress in desegregating jobs and elevating women to positions of authority has remained as limited as Canada's (Jacobs and Lim, 1992: 465-6, 470-1; Rosenfeld and Kalleber& 1990: 85-7) . In Sweden and Canada, female workers continue to predominate, as teachers, secretaries, nurses, domestic servants, and shop assistants, in a restricted of mostly lower-level occupations (Haden ius and Lindgren, 1992; Rosenfeld and 1990: 85-7) . On the other hand, male workers in both countries are found in a variety of fields, but with heavy concentrations in responsible, challenging, and ..,. positions in management, the professions, and skilled trades (Hadenius and Lindgren, 1 Rosenfeld and Kalleberg, 1990: 85-7) . Furthermore, broad measures of segregation that,. if anything, Swedish women are moving into n1ale-dorninated fields even more slowly than their Canadian counterparts (Jacobs and Lim, 1992: 465-6, 470-1 ) . Forty percent of Canadian managers, for example, are now women as against 20 percent in Sweden ('Grubel and Walker, 1989: 97-9~ Rosenfeld and Ka:lleberg, 1990: 85-7) The second part of this paper explains this continued subordination and marginalisation of women in both Sweden and Canada in terms of similarities bẽtween the two nations. It is argued that both countries have attempted to: socially engineer gender equity changes from above without first establishing a broad base of popular support; integrate and thereby subjugate gender equity policy to the demands of the dominant ideology; and avoid any reconsideration of the gender roles that underliẽ the present vertical and horizontal divisions of labour. Finally, the third part of this paper discusses the implications of the preceding two parts by rejecting the applicability and suitability of the Swedish approach to gender equity for Canada and by outlining an alternative solution, involving the participation of women at a highly decentralised level of decision-making in human resource n1anagement matters.
The role of the ẽmployer and union
The collectivist orientation of Swedish society places large federations of employers and unions, representing more than 80 percent of the female workforce (Rosenfeld and Kalleberg, 1990: 87) , in the vanguard of efforts to bring about \vorkplace gender equality, chiefly through measures to increase \:vomen' s relative \:vages. These efforts have, nevertheless, not reflectẽd a major concern for gender, except in the case of the largely peripheral Equal Treatment of Working Life Act 1979 (Weiner and Gunderson, 1990) . In fact, union attention to the low wages predon1inating in women's jobs has always been "part of the more general socialist ẽffort to achieve equality of distribution", rather than 11 as a separate issue having to do with gender" (Acker, 1991: 249) . This focus reflects the reality that "trade unions are dominated by men with whom still lingers the old · ideology that women's issues are bourgeois and potẽntially destructive of working-class solidarity" (Acker, 1991: 249) . For their part, employers have paradoxically committed themselves to the same levelling of incomes, but in anticipation of higher productivity and efficiency.
The device used to ensure greater equality in pay was the wages solidarity policy, which has since been discarded only to be continued in modifieJ form. The method employed to achieve it was the centralised negotiation of master collective agreements, primarily by the blue-co. llar Swedish Trade Union Confederation and the private-sector Swedish Ernployẽrs' Confederation during the years 1956 to I 983 (Ahlen, 1989) . The wages solidarity po: licy provided both equal pay for equal lvork for the same jobs across all industries and fair and reasonable differentia/.,· for different jobs within each industry hierarchy (Rehn, 1984 (Rehn, , 1985 . Its application led to the elimination of separate fernale \:vage scales by 1965 and to the narrowing of hierarchical pay differences particularly after 1968, thereby satisfying union demands for greater equality in earnings (Fulcher, 1991 and co-operatively, because it also served tile employers (Fulcher, 1991 ) .
The wages solidarity policy was abandoned att.r 1913 liBflw-., male union members deserted the central negotiatiNs • t.qpda for lllqpr Willi at the industry level (Ahlen, 1989; Fulcher, 1991 (Acker, 1991: 249 (Ack«, 1991: 251).
Canada
The liberal paradigm casts Canadian employen and unioDS in v.-y mlcB those performed by their Swedish contemporaries, the iaue of at work. It establishes the expectation that fun1s and uniODS will matters such as pay and working conditions at a decentralised ~ so • to bea8r the narrow and immediate, economic interests of individual anploy•s aat1 addition to the supply and demand conditions of local labour markets 1988). This business unionism philosophy has produced very uneven addressing the substantive concerns of women workers, siven priority aad differences among the workers and their unions.. At one extr._ Jarae.
unions have demonstrated both the inclination and atreaath to · agreement clauses relating to no-discrimination by sex. maternity leave, adoption leave", and "personal leave and 1992: 648). At the other extreme, many powerless in pressing a programme of g-rll result, Canadian women continue to earn 65 peroent of Gunderson, 1990: 13 I) , despite the gains achieved by aome workers. However, the actual magnitude of this pay problematic in a liberal country like Canad, since male workers are relatively uncontroversial (llubery, 1992 ;
The important issue, and the subject of debate, is the fairness of ~ro~ed.ure~ for. administering recruitment, selection, pay, and advancement, because d1scn_mtnat!on 1n th~se practices has the effect of undermining the I iberal notion of equality of . opp.ortunJty (Whitehouse, 1992) . On one side of the debate, many ẽmployers express the vtew th~t discrimination is rare and associated primarily with personal prejudices rather than patnarchal rules and customs that exclude and devalue women in unrecognised and unacknowledged ways (Burt, 1986) . They believe that the profit motive already provides sufficient incentive for maintaining meritocratic structures, and so procedural reforms such as employ. ment equity are widely regarded as unnecessary and as unfair for furthering "the collective rights of disadvantaged groups at the expense of what o~ten seem to be the individual rights of advantaged groups" (Burt, 1986: 543) . Most unions and their feminist allies disagree, arguing that legislated pay and employn1ent equity programmes are necessary to combat institutionalised sexism. The Canadian Auto Workers has, for example, suggested that employment equity legislation is needed "to facilitate bargaining with employers to remove systemic barriers", while retaining the liberal view on substantive matters that "the best employment equity programmes ... are designed, implemented, monitored and assessed jointly by unions and · management" (Kumar and Acri, 1992: 634).
The rolẽ of the state
In Sweden, the co-operative efforts of un:ions and employers in compressing wages to the primary benefit of wom, en have been augmẽnted by the state's commitment to fullemployment as a means of enabling all adults to financially support themselves (McCrea, 1977) . Pursuit of this goal has been critical, because accelerated structural change brought on by the wages solidarity policy has over the years displaced thousands of workers from many traditional industries (Rehn, 1984 (Rehn, , 1985 . For this reason, Swedish Trade Union Confederation economists Rehn and Meidner originally recommended that the social democratic government, as the political wing of the labour movement, implement an active labour market policy to combat unemployment (Rehn, 1984 (Rehn, , 1985 .
The active ' labour market policy consists of three sets of interrelated progran1mes, which are used to improvẽ the demand for labour, supply of labour, and matching of supply and demand for labour (Swedish Institute, 1993) . The public costs of these programmes are usually in the range of two to three percent of gross national product per year (Swedish Institute, 1993) . The demand-oriẽnted programmes consist of wage subsidies, recruitment subsidies, and public relief work, which are used to provide more than 60,000 additional jobs per year in occupations, industries, and regions where there are labour surpluses (Swedish Institute, 1993) . The supply-oriented programmes incorporate vocational training and mobility assistance, which are used to increase the availability of qualified workers by more than 100,000 people each year in occupations~ industries, and regions v.;here there are labour shortages (Swedish Institute, 1993) . The matching programmes encon1pass guidance co~nselling, job placement, aptitude testing, occupational rehabilitation, and job clubs, \Vhtch are used to match more than 1 ,000.,000 workers per year with jobs that fit individual needs and abilities (Swedish Institute, seekers, although, in ensuring a uni employment-disadvantaged groups of ~ Westin, 1993; Swedish Institute, 1993 ) . concern for equality of income, implying rather than equality of opportunity as in the focus on equality is also supported by the has stated that "the worst-off women, the influential should be aided first" (McCrea, 1m:
from the active labour market programmes, DOt are disproportionately concentrated in the lOW-WIIII M and Westin, 1993; McCrea, 1977 
Canada
The Canadian state maintains a relatively passive role, when compared to the Swedish in promoting the work status of women. Minimal intervention is predicated on the liberal belief that "the system basically works and is free from discrimiaation and biu". except ia atypical individual circumstances (Warskett, 1991: 180) . The nominal roles of and enforcer which the Canadian state does embrace are based on the liberal notion that the sovereign state is free of external influence and hence suited to the function of · arbiter (Lewis, 1991 ) . The goal pursued remains equality of opportunity for both mea women in the competition for the better jobs and pay, a.; specified by the 1970
Commission on the Status of Women (Warskett, 1991) . Liberal have accepted this goal, with the idea that "gender biu aad diaCiimiaatioa have women from being valued on the basis of merit and achievenaeat, so deayiaa proper place in the hierarchy" (Warskett, 1991: 189 (Warskett, 1991 ) . These laws have creatfil
procedures for individual women seeking redress from discriminating employe~s, .but their positive effects on the pay and working conditions of women h.a~e been hm1ted to. a relatively small group of individuals who have been able and wtlllng to make offic1al complaints (Symes, 1990) . In this instance, liberals failed to recognise the hostility of the social context, particularly in terms of potential retaliation fron1 employers, in discouraging many female employees from accusing their ẽmployers of discrimination (Warskett, 1991 ) . Moreover, the human rights focus on the individual causes of discrimination has proven inadequate for identifying and rectifying those systematic elements of gender inequity that are buried in institutional practices, and are thus not normally apparent in most peopJe's everyday behaviour (Subbarao, 1992) . These inadequacies were highlighted by the Royal Commission on Equality in Employment and led to two new federal initiatives: the Employment Equity Act 1986 and the Federal Contract Compliance Program (Leek and Saunders, 1992~ Subbarao, 1 992). These progranlmes have assumed a more proactive role in requiring larger employers within the federal jurisdiction or supplying the federal government to develop employment equity plans, outlining procedures and goals for the hiring and promoting of women among other disadvantaged groups (Leek and Saunders, 1 992). In addition, the employment equity legislation has requirẽd larger federally regulated employers to submit annual reports, substantiating their progress toward their employmẽnt equity goals (Benimadhu and Wright, 1991; Leek and Saunders, 1992) . Ho\vever, this approach has produced only modest ga· ins in the hiring and promoting of women to non-traditional jobs (Benimadhu and Wright, 1991; Fillmore, 1990; Leek and Saunders, 1992 ; Work life Report, 1994a), because the program: mes provide companies with the discretion to set their own employment equity goals and typically limit the imposition of punitive fines to those companies that have not filed annual reports (Jain, 1989; Subbarao, 1992) . The Õntario Ernployment Equity Act 1994, in following the federal emphasis on goals and plans (Worklife Report 1994b ), has also likely had a re. latively minor effect on the recruiting, hiring, retaining, and promoting of women. This characteristically liberal focus on procedural change has thus once again failed to produce the large, substantive improvements in the pay and working conditions of women that are needed to achieve gender equity.
A similar scenario has developed with proactivẽ pay equity, which has been implemented in Manitoba (1985) , Ontario (1987 ), Nova Scotia (1988 ), Prince Edward Island (1988 ), and New Brunswick (1989 (Worklife Report, 1991) . In all cases except Ontario, pay equity has been confined to the public sector, where it is expect' ·d to provide a rneritocratic n1odel to be voluntarily copied later by efficiency-conscious, private-sector firms (McDermott, 1991 ) . The premise of these pay equity systems is that women's jobs are systematically undervalued relative to men's jobs, and that a meritocracy should be created in which n1en and women in jobs of comparable worth receivẽ the same pay. Worth is assessed through job evaluation schemes which measure and compare the skill, effort, responsibility, and \Vorking conditions of predominantly female and predominantly n1ale job families (Worklife Report, 1991 ) . If these results suggest that male and female jobs in the same firm are of comparable worth, pay equity laws compel employers to provide rnen and won1en in thes· e jobs with comparable pay (Worklife Report, 1991 ) . Pay equity thus represents a more intrusive form of regulation for employers, but its emphasis on procedural reform rather than. substantive outc~mes remains the same as in previous liberal apprpaches. This is particularly problematic for women, because employers retain the freedon1 to conduct job evaluations, as they have done for over ~ skill, effort, responsibility, and working Steinberg, 1992) . In Michigan, for instance adopted a job evaluation plan which main · public sector workers, with the result that g e . , . , (Figart, 1995) . Management's broad decisio such as professionals with the opportunity ID • as American experience already attests, they reaeive _ , otherwise originally intended for women (Evans aad Nelaoa. 1990; Rhoads, 1993) . and Pay equity also has fundamental design flaws. For restrictions on wvo larger employers with more than ten employees in Oataaio aad to public employers ia othe_r jurisdictions prevents many of the most poorly paid women ia consumer se1 vices ....,.
obtaining any right to any wage adjustment at all (McDermott, 1991; Smith, 1988) . Furthermore, the cost economies (see, for example, Weiner aad Gunderson, 1990 : 149 large number of job titles, and internal male pay comparisons necessary for unde1t•king a pay equity job evaluation could inhibit its extension to smaller enterprises in the le future (Smith, 1988) . For these reasons, the impact of pay equity on the gender eaminp gap is likely to remain small, particularly if employers respond to pay equity-mandated wage increases by laying off their female (Rhoads, 1993) . In its best case scenario, experience in Canada and the United States suggests that pay equity can provide women, who have relatively accommodating employers in the public-sector, with raises of up to 10 or 15 percent (Gunderson and Riddell, 1992: 88; Sorensen, 1990: 39; Weiner and Gunderson, 1990: 146) , but at the cost of some reduced employment growth (Killingsworth. 1990: 51) .
Canadian and Swedish similarities . . Social engineering
The failure to substantially improve the work status of women in both Canada and Sweden reflects an unwarranted faith in the government's capacity to implement policies which unilaterally transform traditional values and social structures (Martin and Thorsin-Hamm, 1991 ) . Neither the Swedish nor the Canadian approach recognises that "women's ftft.,. sion is endemic and cannot be rectified through technical tinkering .. (Warskett, 1991: 173) .
As a result, both approaches have been imposed from the top-down without first buildiag mass support across genders, classes, and regions (Martin and Thorsin-Hamm, 1991; Warskett, 1991) .
In Canada, the feminist-dominated National Action Committee on the Status of Women has achieved a reorientation in official policy on gender issues through the passage of employment and pay equity laws (Warskett, 1991) . However, the efficacy of this legislation is seriously undermined by the failure of these liberal fentinists to both defuse business opposition and to organise and then mobilise widespread SUP.port among worbm and unions (Warskett, 1991) . Similarly, in Sweden, social democratic governments aad unions succeeded in narrowing the gender pay gap, prior to 1983, through the centrally negotiated wages solidarity policy (Fulcher, 1991 ) . Nonetheless, the policy eventually collapsed with the exit from the centralised negotiations of disgruntled unions in the maledominated, metal-working sectors (Fulcher, 1991 ) . The implication in these cases is that, for future success, gender reform efforts should be predicated on a greater depth of popular commitment, extending from aiJ leve' ls and positions in society.
Integration
Consciousness-raising has been mitigated in both Sweden and Canada by efforts to accommodate women through programmes of integration (Martin and Thorsin-Hamn1, 1991 ) . These programmes have defused the potential for conflict, while simultaneously preserving the key market institutions \vhich are, in part, responsible for perpetuating wo. men's inferior work status. Concessions are thereby used to renew the commitment of disenfranchised groups to the important social and econon1ic structures which underlie Swedish and Canadian societies. However, the nature of these concessions reflects the reigning ideology in each of the two countries (Martin and Thorsin-Hamm, 1991 ) .
The social democratic philosophy of Sweden emphasises distributive justice in the form of both low income inequality and unemployment (Acker, 1991; Ginsburg, 1983) . The wages solidarity and active labour market policies have respectively reflected these priorities, while leaving the main foundations of th~ capitalist economy intact (Martin and Thorsin-Hamm, 1991 ) . For instance, the wages solidarity policy did compress the pay structure, but did not transform an occupational hierarchy in which women have remained segregated in lowerlevel jobs with little power (Ginsburg, 1983 ~ Rosenfeld and Kalleberg, I 990) . Correspondingly, the active labour market policy has enabled disadvantaged women to obtain employment, but has not elevated them to higher leadership positions \vithin Sv1edish organisations (Martin and Thorsin-Hamm, 1991 ) .
The liberal philosophy of Canada emphasises procedural justice in the form of meritocratic systems for compensation, recruitment, selection, and promotion (Martin and ThorsinHamm, 1991~ Warskett, 1991) . Howẽver, , the reforms derived from this philosophy have not altered the locus of power and influence in Canadian work organ. isations. Pay equity, employment equity, and human rights laws have established bureaucratic constraints on managerial action instead of genuine participation in organisational decision-making (Lewis, 1991 ) . In fact, the technical complexity of procedural constraints has prevented any easy assessment of their impacts, thereby shielding gendered practices from scrutiny (Lewis, 1991 ) . Furthermore, the resulting rationalisation of occupational stratification divides and isolates various gender groups who might otherwise work together in a common cause (Lewis., 1991 ~ Steinberg, 1987 .
Gender role.fi
It has been difficult in both Canada and Sweden to generate popular support for broadbased institutional changes, because the dominant ideologies have displaced gender roles as the focus of reform (Acker, 1991 ~ Martin and Thorsin-Hamm, 1991) For instance, the problems of Canadian women are debated of opportunity. For this reason, pay equi have established procedures for correcting natives, the disabled, and minorities, Sweden, the problems of Swedish women which emphasises income equality and full Hamm, 1991 ) . Wages solidarity and the allive geared toward assisting the least advantaged in particular (McCrea, 1977 Sweden's example. This suggests that additional gender equity reforans in Canada should focus on overcoming the deficiencies of current programmes, as previously described, rather than copying the narrow, uni-dimensional successes of other, ideologically different nations.
The failings of past Swedish and Canadian approaches to gender equity can provide three key lessons for policy-makers and lobbyists to follow in the future. The first is that a socially engineered change is bound to encounter significant resistance from many of the vested interests on whom it is imposed, thereby threatening the political viability of the change. The second lesson is that an attempt to completely integrate a programme within an existing institutional structure risks either stultifying its potential applications, as with employment equity in Canada, or endangering its existence through a closa connection with a threatened institution, as with wages solidarity in Sweden. The third lesson is that a focus on prevailing ideological constructs, such as income equality or equality ar opportunity, Gender Equity 297 diverts attention away from the gender roles that are the basis of women's unequal treatment in the workplace. For these reasons, a new approach is needed that is based on broad political support, fundamental institutional changes, and the transformation of gender roles.
Participation in the design and implementation stages provides one way of generating additional backing for new gender equity programmes. Participatory structures offer many potential advantages. For one, they would provide the means to publicly address or accommodate the complaints and concerns of potential gender equity detractors. They would also provide opportunities for building coalitions across diverse groups of supporters. Perhaps most importantly, they would help activate the involvement of previously apathetic or marginalised sympathisers of the gender equity cause. In this regard, American experience already shows that involving trade unionists and feminist bureaucrats in drafting pay equity legislation leads to larger pay increases for women (Ackẽr, 1989; Evans and Nelson, 1989; Figart, 1995) . New, legislated institutions for joint decision-making would help ẽstablish and mainta-in any participatory structures at both the enterprise and governmental levels. Moreover, exclusive legal jurisdiction for all human resource matters would help ensure that these new participatory mechanisms were not integrated and thereby subordinated to existing institutions, chief of which is the management hierarchy. Involving women in these decision-making processes would provide them with the power and control they need to secure major improvẽments in evẽry aspect of their work status. The participation of women in major positions of authority would also provide a first step in the direction of new gender roles, since women have been typically channelled into morẽ subordinate positions in the past.
